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The actual details of both contracts (the original five-
year employment contract and the noncompete agree-
ment) were not made public; thus it is not known
whether there was a buyout provision in the original
five-year deal. It seems likely that there was one, and the
tax issue is more interesting if we assume that a buyout
provision was present. Regardless of whether there was a
buyout provision, Donovan would be liable for pecuni-
ary damages for breaching the contract, so the assump-
tion of a buyout provision merely adds a layer of
certainty (and possibly a specific monetary value) to the
amount of Donovan’s liability.
In examining the question whether Donovan realized
taxable income, we will discuss the tax consequences of
two possible circumstances.12 In the first circumstance,
we assume the Magic released Donovan without receiv-
ing any compensation from him. The second (and seem-
ingly more accurate circumstance) assumes that the
Magic, in exchange for releasing Donovan from the
employment agreement, required as compensation his
execution of the noncompete contract.
Releasing Donovan for No Compensation
For purposes of analyzing the issues, assume that the
Donovan-Magic employment contract contained a buy-
out provision; to put a figure on it, let’s assume the
amount was $2 million. That is, if Donovan voluntarily
left the team (for example, to coach elsewhere), he would
have been required to pay the Magic $2 million to be
released from his contract with them. On that assump-
tion, his obligation under the buyout provision would
kick in once Donovan reneged on the Magic contract and
returned to Florida.13 Therefore, Donovan would have
had a $2 million liability to the Magic.
Now assume the Magic allowed Donovan to walk
away from the contract without paying any compensa-
tion.14 By agreeing not to enforce the buyout provision,
the Magic canceled Donovan’s $2 million liability to
them.15 Unless an exception applies, Donovan would
recognize income on account of that cancellation of debt
under section 108(a). The closest statutory exclusion of
income is the purchase-money debt reduction in section
108(e)(5). However, that provision applies only to sales of
property and thus is inapplicable to the Donovan-Magic
contract because no sale of property was involved in their
agreement.
With one exception, however, the statutory exceptions
to section 108(a) are not exclusive.16 Judicially created
exceptions, which are part of the common law of taxa-
tion, can also apply. One such exception applies to this
situation.
The ‘‘transactional approach’’ exception, described in
detail below, applies here and results in no income to
Donovan despite his release from the $2 million liability.
The principle that we refer to as the transactional ap-
proach is often applied but is not always called by that
name. The transactional approach is derived from the
rationale for taxing an individual when his debt is
canceled — that is, it is merely a proper application of the
cancellation of debt doctrine when the role of that
doctrine is understood. In one sense, it is not really an
12We can only speculate about what the actual circumstances
might be, but the tax issues of the two that are examined in this
article are worth exploring regardless of what actually occurred.
Similar instances occur in many employment settings. Recent
NCAA basketball examples include Dana Altman, who left
Creighton to coach Arkansas but changed his mind one day
after the announcement, and Gregg Marshall, who left Win-
throp for the College of Charleston and returned shortly after
his introductory press conference. See Pete Thamel and Liz
Robbins, ‘‘Donovan’s N.B.A. Stay Is Expected to Be Brief,’’ The
New York Times, June 5, 2007, at D2. (‘‘Marshall, who is now the
coach at Wichita State, added, ‘This happens all the time in all
kinds of businesses and professions, but usually there’s not a
press conference involved.’’’)
13In fact, Donovan’s indications that he did not wish to coach
the Magic could have been deemed an ‘‘anticipatory repudia-
tion’’ of the contract, which in most courts will give an injured
party ‘‘an immediate claim to damages for total breach.’’
Farnsworth, supra note 9, section 8.20, at 583.
14Although this hypothetical may sound crazy, there may be
valid reasons for doing so. For instance, the Magic likely
recognized that it would be difficult to seek and hire a replace-
ment coach if Donovan were still under contract. It would be
rather difficult to woo a new coach to the Magic while engaging
in a public fight with Donovan. The Magic may also have felt
that it is not worth any bad publicity given that Donovan is a
very popular coach in central Florida and the team is in the
process of trying to build a new arena. See, e.g., John Denton, ‘‘4
Outcomes Magic Saga May Effect,’’ Florida Today, June 10, 2007,
at 4D. (‘‘Though the Magic denied it to the hilt, part of the
thinking going into the Donovan hiring was what effect would
it have on the franchise’s efforts to get the $480 million arena
project passed.’’)
15At first blush, that may sound unrealistic, but a similar
situation occurred recently in the case of new University of
Michigan basketball coach John Beilein. Beilein was under
contract with West Virginia University when he agreed to coach
at Michigan. His contract at West Virginia had a buyout
provision that allowed Beilein to walk away if he would pay
$500,000 per year on his remaining contract. Dave Hickman,
‘‘Settlement Adequately Closes Book on Beilein,’’ Charleston
Gazette (W.Va.), Apr. 27, 2007, at P1B. Beilein had five years
remaining, so the total buyout was, ignoring present value
calculations, slated to be $2.5 million. Id. Beilein and West
Virginia agreed to a lower buyout amount of $1.5 million. (West
Virginia likely accepted a lower amount in part for goodwill and
in part to avoid unnecessary legal fees.) See id. (stating that the
cost of a battle over the buyout ‘‘would be substantial in not
only money but also in time, effort and aggravation’’). As
discussed in this article, that cancellation of debt should not
create income for Beilein. For a more detailed discussion of the
tax consequences of the Beilein case and the issue of a new
employer paying the employee’s personal costs in obtaining the
new employment, see Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey H. Kahn,
‘‘Tax Consequences When a New Employer Bears the Cost of
the Employee’s Terminating a Prior Employment Relationship,’’
9 Fla. Tax Rev. __ (forthcoming 2007).
16Douglas A. Kahn and Jeffrey H. Kahn, Federal Income Tax at
71 (5th ed. 2005). The one exception is that section 108(e)(1)
makes exclusive the statutory insolvency exception (the provi-
sion that prevents recognition of income to the extent that the
debtor is insolvent).
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exception but rather a proper application of the cancel-
lation of indebtedness rule. Consider the following ex-
ample.
A loans B $10,000. Despite having $10,000 more in
assets than he had before the loan was made, B does not
have income based on receiving the loan because B also
has a corresponding obligation to repay the $10,000. B’s
net worth has not improved (assuming a reasonable rate
of interest was to be charged). If a year later, when B is
solvent, A cancels the $10,000 loan without receiving any
consideration, B will have $10,000 of income if no excep-
tion applies. The reason that B has income is that B was
not taxed on the receipt of the $10,000 cash because it was
assumed that B would pay it back. We now know that B
will not repay the $10,000, and so B has $10,000 of
income.17 The cancellation of indebtedness rule is re-
quired because the annual accounting principle prevents
the IRS from redetermining the debtor’s income for the
year in which the loan was made; thus the cancellation of
the debt is treated as income to take into account the
income that was not recognized in the prior year because
of an assumption that proved to be false.
The cancellation of a debt should cause recognition of
income only when the creation or carrying of the debt
prevented the debtor from recognizing income or the
debt provided a tax benefit to the debtor (such as
allowing the debtor to take a deduction). If a debt was not
related to any increase in wealth and did not provide any
tax benefit via a deduction, there is no reason to tax the
debtor on the discharge of that debt. It is that principle
that we refer to as the transactional approach.
As another example, suppose A purchased a painting
from B for the stated price of $50,000; A paid $10,000 cash
and promised to pay the remaining $40,000 in 12 months.
After 12 months, for a valid business reason,18 B agrees to
cancel half the loan. Despite A’s apparent increase in net
worth because of the reduced loan amount, A will not
recognize income because the cancellation is merely a
renegotiation of the purchase price of the painting be-
tween the buyer and seller.19 In fact, as noted above,
section 108(e)(5) would apply to exempt A from recog-
nizing income because the painting is property. But, even
before that statutory exclusion from income was adopted
in 1980,20 case law had excluded the cancellation of A’s
debt from income.21 The current statute, and the prior
case law, treat the cancellation as a mere purchase price
adjustment. Section 108(e)(5) essentially is a codification
of merely one aspect of the transactional principle.
This same reasoning should apply to the Donovan-
Magic agreement. The only difference between the as-
sumed circumstance and the example involving the
painting is that property was not involved in the Dono-
van case. Instead, the contract concerned services. There
is no reason to limit the application of the transactional
approach to agreements between buyers and sellers of
property.22 The statute mentions property because the
cases that had arisen at that time involved property, but
Congress did not intend to make the exceptions it listed
to be exclusive, except for the insolvency exception.23
Indeed, the fact that Congress expressly made the insol-
vency exception exclusive and did not do so for the other
statutory exceptions indicates that the others are not
exclusive. Thus, the transactional approach should apply
and Donovan should not recognize income because of
the cancellation of the buyout liability.
Releasing Donovan for Compensation
As noted above, the Magic did require compensation
from Donovan to walk away from the contract. Specifi-
cally, the Magic appear to have required Donovan to sign
a noncompete agreement that disallows Donovan from
coaching any NBA team for the next five years. The
question is whether that fact changes the above analysis
so that Donovan must recognize income.
The IRS could argue that the result is different in this
case. Donovan exchanged something of value — the
noncompete contract — in exchange for release from at
least some part of the $2 million buyout liability (or, if
there were no buyout agreement, for some part of Dono-
van’s pecuniary obligation for breaching his agreement).
Viewed this way, it is not a cancellation of a debt by the
Magic; instead, it is Donovan’s satisfaction of the debt
17Id. at 71. (‘‘Thus, when a debt is discharged, the realization
of income should not be attributed to the increase in the debtor’s
net worth at the time but rather should be viewed as a removal
of a bar to including a prior increase in the debtor’s assets in his
income.’’)
18For example, if B determined that the painting was not by
the artist stated at the time of purchase, which may have made
it less valuable.
19Note that this adjustment in price would also reduce the
basis in the painting to the new $30,000 purchase price.
20Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, P.L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389
(1980).
21See, e.g., Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 70 F.2d 95, 96 (5th Cir. 1934) (finding that ‘‘there is an
absence of such a gain or profit as is required to come within the
accepted definition of income’’ when debt is canceled for a valid
business reason).
22Cf. Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
Consider one last example that illustrates that a transactional
approach is necessary to comport with the proper function of
the cancellation of indebtedness rule. F makes a written promise
to give G $5,000 one year later. Under state law, the written
promise created a legal obligation even though F received no
consideration for it. When the promise becomes due, F reneges
and will not make the payment. G has a legal right to enforce the
promise, but chooses not to do so and forgives the debt. While
F’s net worth is increased, the debt he created did not prevent
him from recognizing income and did not provide any tax
benefit for him. The cancellation of debt is not income to F, and
should not be.
23Section 108(a)(1)(B) and (3) excludes a cancellation of debt
from a debtor’s recognition of income to the extent that the
debtor was insolvent at the time that the debt was forgiven. The
insolvency exception was applied by case law before it was
codified in 1980. Section 108(e)(1) makes the statutory codifica-
tion exclusive.
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using the noncompete contract as consideration. Pay-
ments for noncompete agreements are clearly taxable.24
Thus, Donovan would recognize as income the amount
of the canceled buyout obligation that is attributable to
Donovan’s execution of the noncompete agreement.
While Donovan could argue that the granting of the
noncompete agreement was not a quid pro quo for the
cancellation of any liability he had under the employ-
ment contract, why would he have executed that agree-
ment if not to compensate for some pecuniary liability he
might owe the Magic? We believe that the buyout (or
other pecuniary obligation) should be bifurcated — some
amount was in exchange for the noncompete contract
and thus should require Donovan to recognize income. A
larger percentage of it was an uncompensated cancella-
tion of debt. That is, Donovan gave up the right to coach
in the NBA for five years so that he could immediately
return to Florida. The Magic, however, agreed to the
noncompete agreement as partial compensation for re-
leasing Donovan from the contract.25 The remainder of
the likely buyout provision was a cancellation of debt
that the Magic likely deemed worthwhile so the team
could save as much face as possible26 while continuing to
pursue their next head coach.
As explained above, the amount that is treated as an
uncompensated cancellation of debt should not be tax-
able to Donovan under the transactional principle. There-
fore, the amount that Donovan should be taxed on is
limited to the value of the noncompete agreement.27
While that valuation could be difficult to make, financial
consultants with experience negotiating noncompete
agreements could provide an estimate of the value of
Donovan’s five-year noncompete contract.
Conclusion
It may appear unfair for Donovan to have income
when all he did was (fairly quickly) change his mind,
something we all do. Usually such flip-flops do not have
income tax consequences. But Donovan’s case has an
additional element. Donovan signed an employment
contract that created a liability for a pecuniary amount if
he breached it. Donovan had some liability even if there
were no buyout provision. But a buyout, which likely
was in his employment contract, will make it easier to
value that obligation. To back out of his employment
contract without paying the Magic any damages, Dono-
van entered into a noncompete contract. Relief of liability
was Donovan’s compensation for agreeing to that con-
tract, and that should result in requiring him to recognize
the value of that relief as income. In our view, only the
amount of the canceled liability that constituted a pay-
ment for the noncompete contract should be taxable to
Donovan. The balance of any forgiven liability, for which
no compensation was received, should be excluded from
income under the transactional approach to the cancella-
tion of debt principle. The amount of the liability that is
payment for Donovan’s noncompete contract should
equal the fair market value of that noncompete contract.
The difficult issue is what that valuation should be.
Although the IRS may argue that the value of the
noncompete contract is the same as the full amount of the
buyout clause (if one exists), because there was an
exchange between parties negotiating at arm’s length, we
believe Donovan has a strong argument that the valua-
tion should be substantially lower. However, unless
Donovan has one more trick up his sleeve, he will have
some amount of income that he cannot make disappear.
24See, e.g., Sigman v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1275
(1972). (‘‘Compensation for refraining from the performance of
services is clearly ordinary income.’’)
25See Thompson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3169 (1997)
(stating that each party provided expert testimony about the
value of some noncompete agreements, but that the tax court is
‘‘not bound by the opinion of any expert witness when that
opinion is contrary to [the court’s] judgment’’).
26‘‘Orlando About Done With Donovan,’’ Chicago Tribune,
June 6, 2007, at 24. (‘‘Orlando and Donovan are laboring to
define their futures fast — Donovan to save his consensus No.
1 recruiting class at Florida, the Magic to save face.’’)
27The IRS could argue that Donovan received the value of the
cancellation of the debt — the full $2 million — in exchange for
the noncompete agreement because there was a clear dollar
value for which Donovan would have been liable, and the
buyout provision makes valuation clear. If the IRS pressed this
issue, Donovan would at least have evidence that the true value
of the buyout clause was less than the stated amount because
colleges and professional sports teams regularly reduce or
eliminate those provisions. See supra note 15 (discussing West
Virginia’s reduction of John Beilein’s buyout provision when he
left to become the University of Michigan basketball coach).
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